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Abstract
This paper describes the equilibrium of a discrete-time exchange economy
in which consumers with arbitrary subjective discount factors and homothetic
period utility functions follow linear Markov consumption and portfolio strate-
gies. Explicit expressions are given for state prices and consumption-wealth
ratios. We provide an analytically convenient continuous-time approximation
and show how subjective rates of time preference aﬀect risk-free rates but not in-
stantaneous risk-return trade-oﬀs. Hyperbolic discount factors can be a source
of return volatility, but they cannot be used to address asset pricing puzzles
related to high-frequency Sharpe ratios.
1. Introduction
Many explicit dynamic equilibrium models in macroeconomics and ￿nance are based
on the assumption that consumers have time and state separable preferences and that
they discount future utilities at a constant rate. This implies that consumer choices
are dynamically consistent.
Psychologists have questioned the validity of the assumption of exponential dis-
counting on the basis of experimental evidence (Chung and Herrnstein (1967), Ainslie
(1975), Kirby and Herrnstein (1995)). These studies suggest instead that subjective
discount functions are approximately hyperbolic. According to this literature, events
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1in the near future tend to be discounted at a higher rate than events that occur in
the long-run. This creates a con￿ict between an individual agent￿s preferences at
diﬀerent points in time: the course of action preferred today by a hyperbolic agent
does not coincide with the one he knows he would like to implement tomorrow. As
a result, self-control and the degree to which agents are able to commit to future
choices become central issues for decision making.
If consumers can perfectly commit to a sequence of consumption choices, then
standard consumer theory applies, whether subjective discount functions are geomet-
ric or not. Consider for example an exchange economy with time-invariant period
utility functions, constant aggregate endowments, and date-zero markets for con-
sumption at all future dates and in all future states. In this economy, the term
structure of interest rates coincides with the term structure of the representative
consumer￿s rates of time preference. As Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) have sug-
gested, the experimental evidence would then lead one to expect higher yields on
short-maturity bonds than on long-maturity bonds. Empirical studies of the term
structure of interest rates indicate that on average the opposite is true.
In this paper, we assume instead that consumers have no means through which
they can commit to future consumption choices. Under this assumption, we exam-
ine an exchange economy with a sequence of markets. In every period, consumers
can trade in a complete set of one-period state-contingent claims on consumption
(and possibly in some long-lived securities as well.) These contracts can be perfectly
e n f o r c e d ,s ot h a tc o n s u m e r sa r ea l l o w e dt ob o r r o wu pt ot h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo ft h e i r
endowments. In contrast, there are no enforceable contracts that allow consumers to
commit in advance to a particular sequence of consumption choices.
Following Strotz (1956) and Pollak (1968), and many others since, we take in-
dividual consumption and portfolio choices to be the outcome of an ￿intrapersonal
game￿ in which the same individual consumer is represented by a diﬀerent player
at every date.1 Consumers are assumed to all have the same constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) preferences. Endowment processes may diﬀer across consumers.
The only restriction we impose on subjective discount factors is that the utility of
aggregate endowments is ￿nite.
We consider competitive equilibria in which consumers follow intrapersonal strate-
gies that give rise to consumption and portfolio choices that are proportional to
wealth. These strategies are required to constitute a Markov perfect equilibrium of
the intrapersonal game. If there is a long-lived asset in positive net supply, then there
is one and only one such competitive equilibrium. The fact that individual behavior is
the outcome of a game implies that standard derivations of a transversality condition
1Beyond the consumption-savings problem, the ￿multiple selves￿ methodology has been applied
to a broad set of self-control issues. See for instance Benabou and Tirole (2002), Carrillo and
Mariotti (2000) and O￿Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001).
2do not apply. We provide conditions on preferences and endowments that never-
theless rule out bubbles on long-lived assets. These conditions also ensure existence
of equilibrium in the absence of a long-lived asset. We obtain explicit expressions
for the consumption and portfolio strategies, as well as for the equilibrium prices of
state-contingent claims.
In two special cases, equilibrium prices will be exactly as if consumers discount
utility geometrically, even when they do not. This happens when endowments are
such that expected utility growth is constant, or when period utility functions are
logarithmic. In both cases, agents consume a constant fraction of wealth in each pe-
riod, irrespective of the shape of the subjective discount function. This observational
equivalence result generalizes a result of Barro (1999) to the case of an economy with
uncertainty.
To gain more insight into the properties of equilibrium state prices, we exam-
ine a limit economy obtained by letting the length of a period go to zero. In this
limit economy, the standard consumption capital asset pricing model (C-CAPM) of
Breeden (1979) applies, irrespective of how consumers discount utility: instantaneous
risk premia are given by instantaneous covariances of returns with marginal utility.
The risk-free rate process, however, is aﬀected by time-inconsistency. It is the sum
of two terms. One is the expected instantaneous growth rate of marginal utility, as
is the case when consumers are time-consistent. The other is a weighted average
of consumer subjective rates of time preference at diﬀerent horizons. The weights
are proportional to discounted expected future period utilities. This second term
introduces a new source of risk-free rate dynamics: variation in expected future en-
dowment growth shifts weights across subjective discount rates at diﬀerent horizons,
a n dt h i si nt u r na ﬀects the current risk-free rate.
The fact that Breeden￿s formula for instantaneous risk premia continues to hold
implies that the high-frequency Sharpe ratios of returns in an economy with non-
geometric subjective discount functions are the same as those in an economy with
time-consistent consumers. Many models of preferences are not able to generate the
high Sharpe ratios found in many data sets (Hansen and Jagannathan (1991)). This
is a puzzle that can therefore not be addressed using only non-standard assumptions
about subjective rates of time preference.
Although ratios of risk premia over return volatilities do not depend on how con-
sumers discount utility, the return volatilities themselves typically do. In particular,
we give conditions under which certain forms of hyperbolic discounting can increase
the volatility of aggregate wealth. Intuitively, the high subjective discount rates for
nearby utilities implied by hyperbolic discount functions must be matched by low
subjective discount rates for utilities in the distant future, or else interest rates would
be too high compared to what is observed in the data. These low long-run subjec-
tive discount rates can make wealth more sensitive to information about long-run
3endowment growth rates.
Related Literature One of the subjective discount functions we consider is the
￿quasi-hyperbolic￿ discount function introduced by Phelps and Pollak (1968) in a
model of imperfect intergenerational altruism. It was later used by Laibson (1994) to
capture the qualitative features of hyperbolic discounting for an individual consumer.
Laibson (1997) shows that a partially illiquid asset may be used as a commitment
device by consumers with time-inconsistent preferences. Harris and Laibson (2001)
study the dynamic choices of a quasi-hyperbolic consumer facing a constant risk-free
interest rate and subject to borrowing constraints. They derive an Euler equation
that depends not only on the level of consumption at two consecutive dates, but
also on the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. Krusell and Smith (1999)
consider an economy with quasi-hyperbolic discount factors and argue that consumers
must have negative rates of time preference for nearby utilities in order to account
for the low level of interest rates observed in US data. In contrast, we incorporate
the high short-run rates of time preference suggested by the psychological literature,
and emphasize that one can use low long-run rates of time preference to account for
the low risk-free rates found in the data.
Outline of the Paper The economy is described in Section 2. In Section 3, we
analyze the intrapersonal game faced by a typical consumer and derive competitive
equilibrium prices. Section 4 derives expressions for interest rates and risk premia in
a limiting economy obtained by letting the length of a period go to zero. In Section
5, we examine the combined implications of hyperbolic discounting and monotone
dynamics in expected utility for the dynamics of the risk-free rate and the volatility
of aggregate wealth. Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
2. An Exchange Economy
2.1. Preferences and Endowments
We consider a discrete-time, in￿nite-horizon economy. Time is labelled by t =
0,1,2,... and uncertainty is described by a probability space endowed with a non-
decreasing ￿ltration {Ft}∞
t=0.F o r e a c h t,w ed e n o t eb yEt[•] the conditional expec-
tation operator with respect to Ft. Throughout, random variables indexed by t are
taken to be Ft-measurable.
There is a single good available for consumption in every period. The representa-
tive consumer￿s non-negative endowments of this good are denoted by {nt}∞
t=0.O n e
interpretation is that the consumer supplies labor inelastically and has access to a
linear technology that converts labor into consumption goods. There are also k−1 ≥ 0
units of a long-lived asset or ￿stock￿ that produces non-negative dividends {dt}∞
t=0.
4Aggregate endowments are denoted by et = nt + dtk−1. W ea s s u m et h a ta g g r e g a t e
endowments are strictly positive at all dates, with probability one.
Following Peleg and Yaari (1973), we view the representative consumer as com-
posed of a sequence of autonomous decision makers, indexed by time. We refer to the
decision maker at date t as the ￿date-t consumer.￿ This date-tconsumer evaluates










where δ0 =1and δn > 0. These preferences are time-inconsistent if δn+1/δn is not






for some γ > 0, γ 6=1 .W et a k eγ =1to mean u(c)=l n ( c). It is easy to modify (1)
to incorporate habits or subsistence levels of consumption.
2.2. Examples of Subjective Discount Factors
It is convenient to set:
δn = δ(nτ),
where δ is a positive discount function de￿ned on [0,∞),a n dτ > 0 is the length
of a period. The discrete-time subjective rate of time preference can be de￿ned as
−ln(δn+1/δn)/τ. For smooth discount functions, this converges to ρ(t)=−Dδ(t)/δ(t)
as τ goes to zero.
Experimental studies by psychologists (see Ainslie (1975), Kirby and Herrnstein
(1995), and, for a survey, Ainslie (1992)) and economists (Thaler (1981)) suggest
that rates of time preference tend to decline as a function of the horizon over which
utility is discounted. O￿Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001) refer to this phenomenon
as ￿present bias.￿ A discount function that captures present bias is:
δ(t)=( 1+ζt)
−ξ/ζ exp(−ρt). (2)
This combines an exponential discount function with the ￿generalized hyperbolic￿
discount function for which Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) have suggested an ax-
iomatic justi￿cation. It generalizes the hyperbolic discount function proposed by
Ainslie (1975) to interpret experiments that indicate reversals over time of prefer-
ences for rewards at diﬀerent horizons.
The resulting subjective discount rate is given by ρ(t)=ρ + ξ/(1 + ζt).T h i s
converges to ρ + ξ as the horizon goes to zero, and it declines monotonically to ρ as
5the horizon goes to in￿nity. Increasing ρ increases the discount rate at all horizons,
and increasing ξ raises the subjective discount rate more at short horizons than at
long horizons. The parameter ζ g o v e r n st h es p e e da tw h i c ht h es u b j e c t i v er a t eo f
time preference changes from its short-run value ρ + ξ to its long-run value ρ.A t
ξ =0 , there is no diﬀerence between short-run and long-run discount rates, and one
obtains the standard exponential discount function exp(−ρt). Similarly, letting ζ go
to zero yields the exponential discount function exp(−(ρ + ξ)t).
A particularly convenient limiting discount function is obtained by letting the
speed parameter ζ and the discrepancy ξ between short and long-run discount rates go
to in￿n i t ya tt h es a m et i m e .S p e c i ￿cally, take some δ+ < 1,s e tξ = −ln(δ+)ζ/ln(ζ),
and let ζ go to in￿nity. Then δ(t) converges to:
δ(t)=δ+ exp(−ρt) (3)
for all t>0. The corresponding discrete-time discount factors can be written as
δn = δ+β
n,f o rs o m ep o s i t i v eβ and all n>0. These are the discount factors
used by Phelps and Pollak (1968), and more recently Laibson (1994, 1997), Harris
and Laibson (2001), and many others. Laibson (1994) argued that these discount
factors can provide a good approximation to hyperbolic discount factors and called
this ￿quasi-hyperbolic discounting.￿
2.3. Markets
Our main assumption is that markets are sequentially complete. One-period ahead
state-contingent claims are traded at every date and in every state. The cost at date
t of a portfolio of state contingent claims that delivers bt+1 units of consumption at
date t+1is Et[πt+1bt+1]/πt units of consumption, where {πt}∞
t=0 is a strictly positive
sequence of probability-weighted state-contingent prices. Stocks are traded at all
dates t, at ex-dividend prices equal to st units of consumption per unit of stock. We
restrict attention to equilibria in which stock prices are non-negative.
At date t,t h ed a t e - t consumer can choose non-negative consumption ct,ap o r t f o l i o
of state-contingent claims bt+1, and an amount of stock kt, subject to the period-t
budget constraint:
πtct +E t[πt+1bt+1]+πtstkt ≤ πt[nt + bt +( st + dt)kt−1], (4)







+ πt+1[bt+1 +( st+1 + dt+1)kt] ≥ 0. (5)
There are no contingent claims outstanding at the initial date, and so b0 =0 .T h e
constraint (5) restricts the portfolio of bt+1 and kt chosen by the date-t consumer to
be such that wealth at the beginning of period t +1is non-negative in every state.
6In view of the fact that markets are complete, and since there are no constraints on
portfolios other than that current consumption and next-period wealth must remain
non-negative, we focus on equilibria in which prices satisfy the no-arbitrage condition:
πtst =E t [πt+1(st+1 + dt+1)]. (6)
A violation of this condition would imply that the date-t consumer could choose to
consume an unlimited amount.2
The only way in which the portfolio choices of the date-t consumer aﬀect the set
of feasible choices at later dates is through their eﬀect on date-t +1wealth. It will







+ πt[bt +( st + dt)kt−1]. (7)
Given the no-arbitrage condition (6), it then follows that the set of budget-feasible
consumption choices de￿ned by (4)-(5) is equivalent to the set of sequences {ct}∞
t=0
that satisfy, for some sequence {wt+1}∞
t=0:
πtct +E t[πt+1wt+1] ≤ πtwt, (8)
ct,w t+1 ≥ 0,
with initial wealth w0 de￿ned by (7). Note that the stochastic process of endowments
{et}∞
t=0 only aﬀects the consumer￿s set of feasible consumption choices via initial
wealth, unlike in models with borrowing constraints that are tighter than (5), such
as in Harris and Laibson (2001). For an individual consumer there is therefore no
commitment value to changing his or her endowment process using, say, pension
investments that are not directly tradable.
2.4. Intrapersonal and Competitive Equilibrium
In any period, the consumer can in no way restrict his future actions, other than
through the amount of wealth transferred to the next period. Behavior of the
in￿nitely-lived consumer is therefore not the outcome of a single utility maximiza-
tion, but of a strategic interaction among the sequence of date-t consumers who make
choices at successive dates.
This results in an intrapersonal game in which each date-t consumer chooses
his current consumption ct and next-period state-contingent wealth wt+1,t a k i n ga s
given a sequence of prices {πt,s t}∞
t=0 and the strategies of the date-s consumers for
all s>t . A strategy for the date-t consumer in the intrapersonal game is a mapping
2For certain period utility functions u, it may be possible to construct equilibria in which such
arbitrage opportunities are not exploited. We will not consider this possibility here.
7(Ct,W t+1) that speci￿es, for any history ht of the game up to date t, a consumption
level ct = Ct(ht), and amounts of state-contingent wealth wt+1 = Wt+1(ht),s u c ht h a t
the budget constraint (8) is satis￿ed given wt. The history ht consists of all events
observed by the date-t consumer, including the realizations of endowments and prices,
as well as past consumption and wealth choices. Given a price sequence {πt,s t}∞
t=0,
an intrapersonal equilibrium is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the intrapersonal
game played by the sequence of date-t consumers.
A competitive equilibrium of the representative agent economy is given by a strat-
egy pro￿le {(Ct,W t+1)}∞




t=0 satis￿es the arbitrage condition (6);
(ii) The present value of endowments is ￿nite at prices {πt}∞
t=0;
(iii) {(Ct,W t+1)}∞
t=0 is an intrapersonal equilibrium at prices {πt,s t}∞
t=0;









+ πt+1(st+1 + dt+1)k−1,
where ht is the date-t history of an intrapersonal equilibrium path implied by
{(Ct,W t+1)}∞
t=0.
The price-taking assumption entails that each date-t consumer uses the prevailing
prices when evaluating the payoﬀ of a deviation from the intrapersonal equilibrium.
Markets need not clear following a deviation in the intrapersonal game.
3. Equilibrium
B e c a u s ec o n s u m e r sa r ea s s u m e dt ob ei n ￿nitely lived, the intrapersonal game that
determines behavior may have many subgame perfect equilibria. We focus here on
Markov perfect equilibria in which the consumption and portfolio choices of the con-
sumer at any date depend only on current wealth and on exogenous variables.3 This
rules out bootstrap strategies that might otherwise be used to mitigate the consumer￿s
self-control problem (see Laibson (1994)).
3This is also the perspective adopted by Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Harris and Laibson (2001).
83.1. Intrapersonal Equilibrium
Fix prices, and consider a Markov perfect equilibrium for the intrapersonal game.
With slight abuse of notation, let Ct(w) and Wt+1(w) denote the consumption and
wealth choices of a date-t consumer who starts with date-t wealth w. Given these
Markov strategies, let Ct,t+n(w) be the implied level of consumption chosen by the
date-t + n consumer in the subgame in which the date-t consumer starts with date-t














The current value Ft(w) is the expected utility for the date-t consumer in the subgame
in which the date-t consumer starts with wealth w. The continuation value Vt(w) is
the utility perceived by the date-t−1 consumer for this same subgame. In any Markov
equilibrium, Ct(w) and Wt+1(w) must be a best response for the date-t consumer when
his initial wealth is w.T h a ti s ,w em u s th a v e :
Ft(w)= m a x
ct,wt+1≥0
{u(ct)+E t [Vt+1(wt+1)] : πtct +E t[πt+1wt+1] ≤ πtw} (10)
for all possible levels of initial date-t wealth w.4
Starting from initial wealth w0 de￿ned by (7), write wt+1 = Wt+1(wt) and ct =
Ct(wt) for all t. Under regularity conditions that will be veri￿ed below, the sequence








Combining the ￿rst-order condition at date t with the envelope condition at date









Clearly, if δn = β
n, then (9) implies Vt+1(wt+1)=βFt+1(wt+1), and (13) yields
the standard ￿rst-order condition. More generally, (13) shows that the standard
geometric subjective discount factor must be replaced by a ratio of marginal utilities
of wealth based on the continuation value function Vt+1 and next period￿s current
value function Ft+1.
The homotheticity of preferences suggests a Markov perfect equilibrium of the
intrapersonal game that is linear in wealth:
Ct(w)=φtw, Wt+1(w)=ψt+1w, (14)
4This equation is related to the ￿quasi-Bellman equation￿ developed by Harris and Laibson (2001)
for quasi-hyperbolic subjective discount functions.
9for some time and state dependent coeﬃcients φt and ψt+1 that do not depend on
wealth. The strategies (14) imply that Ft(w) and Vt(w) as de￿n e di n( 9 )a r eb o t h
proportional to w1−γ/(1 − γ). The maximization in (10) therefore implies a date-t
best response that is linear in date-t wealth, and the right-hand side of (10) will again
be proportional to w1−γ/(1 − γ). The Markov strategies (14) constitute a subgame
perfect equilibrium of the intrapersonal game if the coeﬃcients {φt,ψt+1}∞
t=0 are such
that (10) is satis￿ed at every date and in every state for Ft and Vt+1 constructed from
these coeﬃcients according to (9).
3.2. Competitive Equilibrium
Except for the special case of logarithmic preferences, it is hard to explicitly solve for
a Markov equilibrium of the intrapersonal game at arbitrary prices. But to construct
a competitive equilibrium, we only need to solve for an intrapersonal equilibrium at
market clearing prices.
Equilibrium State Prices The homotheticity of the period utility function implies
that Ft(w)/[Ct(w)]1−γ and Vt(w)/[Ct(w)]1−γ only depend on w via the consumption
growth rates Ct,t+n(w)/Ct(w). But the linearity of the strategies (14) implies that
Ct,t+n(w)/Ct(w) does not depend on w, while market clearing requires that this ratio





























The envelope condition (12) combined with ct = φtwt and the expression for Ft(w)
in (15) yields φt =1 /Γt.T o g e t h e r w i t h wt+1 = ψt+1wt and the fact that market









This expresses the coeﬃcients of the linear Markov strategies (14) in terms of the
endowment process of the economy. To construct an explicit formula for equilibrium











In any equilibrium in which consumers follow Markov strategies that are linear in
wealth, state prices must be of this form.
10Remaining Equilibrium Conditions Clearly, the construction leading up to
(17)-(18) requires that Γt and ∆t are ￿nite. That is, utility of the aggregate en-
dowment process must be ￿nite at every date and in every state. If this is the case,
then the strategies de￿ned by (14) and (17) are such that consumption grows at the
same rate as the aggregate endowments. The only remaining requirement for a com-
petitive equilibrium is that the levels of the consumption and endowment processes
are the same as well.
By iterating on (8) and using the market clearing requirement eT = wT/ΓT one
can verify that initial wealth must be equal to the present value of the aggregate
endowments, plus limT→∞ E0[πTeTΓT]. Similarly, by iterating on (6) and using the
de￿nition of wealth (7) one obtains that initial wealth must also be equal to the
present value of the aggregate endowments, plus limT→∞ E0[πTsT]k−1. Our construc-
tion yields an equilibrium if these two limit terms are equal. If the stock is in positive
net supply, this can be guaranteed by assigning a high enough value to s0;i np a r t i c -
ular, there may have to be a bubble on the stock. On the other hand, if k−1 =0 ,
then an assumption is needed to ensure that E0[πTeTΓT] goes to zero as T gets large.














This is not something that follows simply from assuming that utility of the aggregate
endowments is ￿nite. Either of the following two assumptions is suﬃcient to ensure
that (19) holds.
Condition A There is an α > 0 such that αΓt ∈ (0,1] at all dates and in all states.












at every date and in every state.
The proof of the following proposition is given in Appendix A.5
Proposition 1 If there is a long-lived asset in positive net supply, or if at least one
of Conditions A or B holds, then there is an equilibrium in which consumption and
5The proposition does not cover the case of quasi-hyperbolic preferences with δ+ > 1, but a
separate proof can be given in this case.
11portfolio choices are proportional to wealth. The strategies are given by (14) and
(16)-(17), and equilibrium state prices are given by (18).
It is possible to construct examples in which there must be a bubble on the long-lived
asset.6 In such examples, the consumption-wealth ratio goes to zero fast enough
so that consumers do not exhaust their present-value budget constraints. This is
consistent with equilibrium only if there is a long-lived asset that trades above the
present value of its dividends. For time-consistent consumers, single-agent optimiza-
tion implies that consumers exhaust their present-value budget constraints, and this
is the argument that is traditionally used to derive a transversality condition that
can then in turn be used to rule out bubbles on long-lived assets (see Scheinkman
(1977), Brock (1979) and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1983)). Here, the requirement that
consumers play a subgame-perfect equilibrium does not guarantee that they exhaust
their present-value budget constraints, and so a transversality condition need not
apply.
The possible need for Conditions A or B or bubbles is a consequence of our focus
on Markov strategies. If we allow for non-Markov strategies, then there is always
a competitive equilibrium in which there are no bubbles on long-lived assets. The
equilibrium consumption and portfolio choices are aﬃne functions of wealth, and the
formula for state prices (18) continues to hold.
Logarithmic Preferences The above derivations do not apply directly to the case
of γ =1 , although (16)-(18) do hold. For logarithmic preferences, the intrapersonal
game can be solved explicitly. The solution is φt =1− ﬂ β and ψt+1 = ﬂ βπt/πt+1 where
ﬂ β =1− 1/
P∞
n=0 δn, given any state prices for which wealth is ￿nite. One can use
this to solve for equilibrium state prices, even when consumers are heterogeneous in
terms of their subjective discount functions. The ratio of consumption (wealth) to
aggregate consumption (wealth) converges to one for the consumer who is the most
patient on average (the one with the highest ﬂ β.) In an economy with both time-
consistent and time-inconsistent consumers, this could easily be a time-inconsistent
consumer with high subjective rates of time preference at nearby horizons￿as long
as this consumer￿s long-run subjective rates of time preference are suﬃciently low.
3.3. Implications
Eﬀective Subjective Discount Factors As can be seen from the equation for
state prices (18), the two variables that determine state prices in this economy are
endowment growth and the ratio ∆t+1/Γt+1. If consumers discount geometrically, the
ratio ∆t+1/Γt+1 is constant and equal to the subjective discount factor β.F o rg e n e r a l
6An example is an economy with et =( t!)(1+ε)/(1−γ) and δn =( β
n/n!)1+ε. This yields a positive
l i m i ti n( 1 9 )i fε > 0, even though expected utility is ￿nite.
12subjective discount factors, ∆t+1/Γt+1 is an ￿eﬀective subjective discount factor￿ that






















These weights are proportional to the expected utility of date-t+1+n consumption
from the perspective of the date-t+1consumer. In the special case of quasi-hyperbolic
discounting, δ0 =1and δn = δ+β










of Harris and Laibson (2001). More generally, consider the properties of (21) if
subjective discount rates are relatively high at nearby horizons, and low at distant
horizons. The discount rates implied by ∆t+1/Γt+1 will then depend on the timing
of endowment growth. If γ > 1, high early endowment growth lowers the weights on
δn+1/δn for small values of n and this lowers the discount rate implied by ∆t+1/Γt+1.
If the same amount of endowment growth is delayed, more weight is put on δn+1/δn
for small values of n. Delayed growth therefore increases the discount rate implied
by ∆t+1/Γt+1.
Identi￿cation The distinguishing characteristic of non-geometric discounting is the
fact that the usual geometric subjective discount factor is replaced by ∆t+1/Γt+1 in
(18). This implies that it is not possible to diﬀerentiate non-geometric discount factors
from geometric ones if ∆t+1/Γt+1 happens to be constant. This will be the case if the
conditionally expected utility ratio Et [(et+1/et)1−γ] is constant. For any subjective
discount function, one can then construct an alternative economy with a geometric
subjective discount factor given by ﬂ β = ∆t+1/Γt+1. State prices will be the same
in both economies. It is not diﬃcult to verify that the wealth-consumption ratio in
the alternative economy is again equal to a sum of expected utility ratios, discounted
using the geometric subjective discount factor ﬂ β. Thus consumption-wealth ratios
cannot be used to identify properties of the subjective discount function either.
As an example, one can take endowment growth to be i.i.d. and the information
structure {Ft}∞
t=0 such that at any date nothing is known about future endowment
growth. Alternatively, one can take preferences to be logarithmic. If γ =1 ,t h e n
13Γt+1 and ∆t+1 are simply sums of subjective discount factors and thus ∆t+1/Γt+1 is
obviously constant across time.7
4. A Continuous-Time Approximation
In the continuous-time version of the consumption capital asset pricing model studied
by Breeden (1979), instantaneous expected returns in excess of the risk-free rate are
equal to the instantaneous covariance of returns with marginal utility. The risk-free
rate is equal to a constant subjective rate of time preference plus the expected instan-
taneous growth rate of marginal utility. In this section we describe how Breeden￿s
results change when consumers are time-inconsistent. This will allow us to highlight
properties of short-horizon returns in an economy with time-inconsistent consumers
that are not apparent from the discrete-time state price formula (18).
4.1. Limit Properties of Discrete-Time Economies
Suppose that there exists an underlying continuous-time endowment process {et}t≥0







where {Wt}t≥0 is a vector of independent standard Brownian motions, and {xt}t≥0 is
a vector of state variables that satis￿es:
dxt = ￿x(xt)dt + σx(xt)
>dWt. (24)
Suppose also that the subjective discount function δ is de￿ned for all t ∈ [0,∞) and
normalized so that δ(0) = 1.
Given the endowment process {et}t≥0 and the discount function δ,w ec o n s t r u c ta
sequence of discrete-time economies as follows. For any period length τ > 0,c o n s i d e r
a discrete-time economy with a sequence of subjective discount factors δn = δ(nτ)






















When t is an integer multiple of τ, these de￿nitions correspond to those given in
(16). In equilibrium, the ratio of consumption per unit of time over wealth in this
7Barro (1999) observes that in the standard deterministic Cass-Koopmans growth model one
cannot infer from data whether consumers discount geometrically or not if the economy is in steady
state, or if preferences are logarithmic. See also Laibson (1996).
14discrete-time economy is equal to 1/τΓt(τ),f o rt =0 ,τ,2τ,..., as in (17). From (18),











again for t =0 ,τ,2τ,....
We now construct a continuous-time state-price process from (26) and examine
the properties of its sample path as τ goes to zero. We adopt the normalization
π0(τ)=e
−γ
0 .D e ￿ne πt(τ) to be the product of π0(τ) and the sequence of one-period
ahead state prices (26) up to period [[t/τ]] − 1,w h e r e[[t/τ]] is the integer part of t/τ.























For every τ > 0,t h i sd e ￿nes a continuous-time process indexed by t that coincides
with (26) for any t equal to an integer multiple of τ.
Proposition 2 Under regularity conditions, the state prices {πt(τ)}t≥0 for a discrete-
time economy with period length τ converge as τ goes to zero, with probability one,
to state prices {πt}t≥0 given by:



































Appendix B gives a precise statement and proof of this result. The expressions (28)-
(30) are as might be expected given (25)-(27). In particular, note that τΓt(τ) can
be interpreted as an integral of discounted future expected utility ratios against time
that converges to Γ(xt), and that the diﬀerence Γt(τ) − ∆t(τ) can be interpreted as
an integral of future expected utility ratios against δ that converges to Φ(xt) as τ
goes to zero.
15Eﬀective Subjective Discount Rates The ratio Φ(xt)/Γ(xt) will be referred to
as the ￿eﬀective subjective discount rate.￿ It replaces the constant subjective discount
rate that would appear in (28) if consumers discounted utility geometrically.
If δ is suﬃciently smooth so that one can write δ(t)=e x p ( −
R t
0 ρ(v)dv),t h e nt h e



















as in (21). Of course, (31) will be constant if δ is exponential.
Alternatively, consider the quasi-hyperbolic discount function (3). This is clearly
non-smooth: an arbitrarily small positive delay results is a discrete drop in the dis-



















As expected, (32)-(33) implies that the eﬀective subjective discount rate is increasing
in ρ and the instantaneous discount 1 − δ+.
Remark Proposition 2 describes the limiting properties of a sequence of discrete-
time economies as the period length goes to zero. It is also possible to analyze the
continuous-time economy directly. Following Barro￿s (1999) analysis of the determin-
istic Cass-Koopmans growth model, one way to do this is to assume that consumers
can commit to a particular consumption strategy for a short period of time, and
then let this commitment period go to zero. In Luttmer and Mariotti (2000a) we
prove that this also yields (28) when the discount function for an economy with a
commitment period of length τ is given by δτ(t)=1if t ∈ [0,τ) and δτ(t)=δ(t) if
t ∈ [τ,∞).I fδτ(t)=δ(t) for all t instead, then any discontinuity of δ at zero would
not be re￿ected in the limit, and the domain of integration in (29) would be (0,∞)
instead of [0,∞).
164.2. Interest Rates and Risk Premia
Let Rt be the date-t cumulative return on some asset. That is, one unit of consump-
tion invested at date t yields RT/Rt units of consumption at date T>tif the asset
is held from t to T, and any dividends are reinvested. Suppose that we have an asset














for some r(xt) and λ(xt) that are given below. To avoid arbitrage opportunities,
cumulative returns must satisfy πtRt =E t[πTRT] for all t ≤ T.T h u s πtRt has no
drift, and an application of Ito￿s lemma therefore implies the well-known relation:
￿R(xt) − r(xt)=σR(xt)
>λ(xt). (34)
If σR(xt)=0 , then the cumulative return Rt is instantaneously risk-free, and so r(xt)
can be interpreted as the risk-free rate. The coeﬃcient λ(xt) is usually referred to as










Equations (34)-(36) show how the equilibrium risk-free rate and risk premia are de-
termined by preferences and endowments.
The key implication of (35)-(36) is that the shape of the subjective discount func-
tion δ in￿uences state prices only via the risk-free rate. In turn, the risk-free rate is
only aﬀected by the shape of δ through its eﬀect on the eﬀective subjective discount
rate Φ(xt)/Γ(xt). The other determinants of the risk-free rate are the usual intertem-
poral substitution and precautionary savings eﬀects represented by the second and
third terms in (35). The dynamics of the risk-free rate will depend on the interaction
of these standard eﬀects with the variation in the eﬀective subjective discount rate
that arises when discounting is not exponential.
By contrast, the shape of the subjective discount function δ has no eﬀect on the
market price of risk λ(xt). Recall that the instantaneous Sharpe ratio for the cu-
mulative return Rt is de￿ned by [￿R(xt) −r(xt)]/[σR(xt)>σR(xt)]1/2. From (34), this
is equal to σR(xt)>λ(xt)/[σR(xt)>σR(xt)]1/2. As pointed out by Hansen and Jagan-
nathan (1991), the absolute value of this ratio is a lower bound for [λ(xt)>λ(xt)]1/2,
and thus, because of (36), for γ[σe(xt)>σe(xt)]1/2. Given several returns processes,
17one can tighten this lower bound by using the portfolio with the highest Sharpe ratio.
If we can use means and variances of monthly returns to approximate instantaneous
Sharpe ratios, then the estimates reported in Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) indi-
cate that extreme levels of risk aversion are required to reconcile return data and
data on aggregate consumption in the US. Because the market price of risk does not
depend on the shape of δ, this is a puzzle that cannot be understood by modifying
standard assumptions about how consumers discount utility.
It should be emphasized, though, that this does not mean that risk premia and re-
turn volatilities do not depend on the speci￿cation of the subjective discount function.





t , and the price of the asset depends on how both these factors correlate with
dividends. For an important example, consider the in￿nitely-lived asset that generates
dividends equal to aggregate endowments. The price of this asset is simply aggregate
wealth etΓ(xt). The return on aggregate wealth consist of an instantaneously risk-
free dividend yield 1/Γ(xt), and risky capital gains that arise from changes in etΓ(xt).







when Rt is taken to be the return on aggregate wealth. But the wealth-consumption
ratio Γ(xt) is simply the expected value of (et+v/et)1−γ for v>0,d i s c o u n t e db yδ(v).
This means that DΓ(xt)/Γ(xt), and thus the volatility of the return on aggregate
wealth and, by (34), the risk premium on aggregate wealth will depend on the shape
of the subjective discount function δ.
5. Present Bias, Interest Rate Dynamics, and Volatility
Equilibrium prices depend on the shape of the subjective discount function via its
impact on the eﬀective subjective discount rate Φ(xt)/Γ(xt).W e w a n t t o e x a m i n e
in more detail how present bias aﬀects this discount rate, as well as the volatility
of the consumption-wealth ratio 1/Γ(xt). From (29) and (30) it is clear that the
dependence of expected utility growth on the current state and the horizon is going
to be important. For general endowment processes, this dependence can be quite
complicated, and this makes it hard to determine the eﬀects of changing the shape
of the subjective discount function. In the following, we identify a class of endow-
ment processes for which the interaction between utility growth and present bias
can be examined analytically. We then present a parametric example for which we
give a complete characterization of the eﬀects of present bias on interest rates and
consumption-wealth ratios.
185.1. Monotone Utility Dynamics










against, respectively, −dδ(t) and δ(t)dt. Note that this ratio is negatively related
to expected utility growth if γ > 1. Suppose now that {xt}t≥0 is a stationary scalar
diﬀusion, and consider the following restriction on endowments and utility.









Since DxG(x,0) = 0, Condition M implies that DxG(x,t) has the same sign for all
t>0. Condition M therefore says that a change in the state has an impact on the
log of the expected utility ratio that increases monotonically as the horizon increases.
Roughly, this property can arise if a change in x0 has an immediate impact on e0,
small or no eﬀects on endowments in the long-run, and eﬀects on intermediate et that
decline monotonically in t.
Using Condition M, we can sign the correlation between the expected utility ratio
G(x,t) and eﬀective subjective discount rate Φ(x)/Γ(x), and we can determine the
eﬀect on DΓ(x)/Γ(x) of certain parametric changes in δ.R e c a l l t h a t f o r s m o o t h
discount functions, Φ(x)/Γ(x) is a weighted average of the subjective discount rate

















Note that the right-hand side of this equation can be interpreted as a covariance.
This leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose that δ is smooth, with subjective discount rates ρ(t) that are









We say that subjective discount rates exhibit ￿monotone present bias￿ when ρ(t) is
a decreasing function of t. Lemma 1 states that the eﬀective subjective discount rate
Φ(x)/Γ(x) and the expected utility ratio G(x,t) vary with x in opposite directions
when subjective discount rates exhibit monotone present bias. For example, if γ > 1
19and if a high value of x implies high future endowment growth, then a high value
of x will tend to imply a low value of expected utility ratio G(x,t).T h u sL e m m a1
implies that high expected endowment growth tends to go together with high eﬀective
subjective discount rates when γ > 1.
Next, consider varying the subjective discount function parametrically. Write δα
for a subjective discount function indexed by some scalar parameter α,a n dl e tΓα(x)


















where the weights ωα(x,t) are proportional to δα(t)G(x,t). Note again that the
right-hand side of this equation can be interpreted as a covariance.
Lemma 2 Suppose that δα is smooth, with subjective discount rates ρα(t) that are













For example, if δα(t)=e x p ( −αt), this simply says that geometrically discounted
expected utility ratios become more sensitive to the state as one lowers the discount
rate. For general subjective discount functions, this conclusion continues to hold if
one lowers subjective discount rates at all horizons.
It should be emphasized that Condition M is only a suﬃcient condition. The
conclusions of Lemmas 1 and 2 apply more generally if endowments are such that
any oscillations over time in DxG(x,t)/G(x,t) are relatively small.
5.2. Parametric Examples
Consider the endowment process et =e x p ( ηt−xt),w h e r ext is a square-root process:
dxt = κ(￿ − xt)dt + σ
√
xt dWt, (38)
for positive κ, ￿ and σ (see Feller (1951), or Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985)). It
can be veri￿ed that Condition M is satis￿ed for these endowments.8 Since xt is
non-negative and mean-reverting, this example implies that logarithmic endowments
￿uctuate below some linear trend. The example can be extended to allow for a
stochastic trend while preserving Condition M. For high values of x, endowments are
far below trend. Expected endowment growth is then high and uncertain. For γ > 1,
this implies a low expected utility ratio G(x,t).
8This follows from the fact that DxG(x,t)/G(x,t)=−xA((1 + Be−κt)−1 − (1 + B)−1), where
A =2 κ/σ2 and B =( 1− γ)/(1 − γ − A).
20We now consider the eﬀects of present bias using two alternative subjective dis-
count functions. In both cases, we adjust the subject discount function so that the
risk-free rate remains unchanged on average. Very high short-run subjective discount
rates have been suggested in the literature. Only if long-run subjective discount rates
are correspondingly low will the implied risk-free rate be in the range observed in
most data sets.
Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting Recall that the eﬀective subjective discount rate
for quasi-hyperbolic discount function is increasing in both the long-run discount rate
ρ and the instantaneous discount 1−δ+. Making consumers present-biased amounts
to increasing the discount 1−δ+. By (33), this has no eﬀect on DΓ(xt)/Γ(xt).B u tt o
k e e pt h er i s k - f r e er a t et h es a m eo na v e r a g e ,w eh a v et ol o w e rρ.L e m m a2a p p l i e dt o
δρ(t)=e x p ( −ρt) implies that this makes the wealth-consumption ratio more volatile.
A higher value of x implies higher future endowment growth. Suppose γ > 1,
so that G(x,t) and therefore Γ(x) is decreasing in x . This means that the wealth-
consumption ratio and current consumption move together. The added volatility
of the wealth-consumption ratio that comes about from making consumers present-
biased therefore increases the risk premium on aggregate wealth (by (34) and (37)).
Consider the risk-free rate. Equation (32) implies that increasing the present
bias discount 1 − δ+ together with the fact that Γ(x) is decreasing in x when γ >
1 implies that the eﬀective subjective discount rate Φ(x)/Γ(x) is increasing in x.
Higher future endowment growth therefore makes consumers more impatient. It
follows that the eﬀective subjective discount rate and the intertemporal substitution
eﬀect γκ((1 + σ2/(2κ))x − ￿) are positively correlated. The precautionary savings
eﬀect is given by −γ(1 + γ)σ2x/2, and thus negatively correlated with both the
eﬀective subjective discount rate and the intertemporal substitution eﬀect. If the
precautionary savings eﬀect dominates the intertemporal substitution eﬀect, then
making consumers present-biased will reduce the variability of the risk-free rate.
Generalized Hyperbolic Discounting Clearly, the discount function (2) exhibits
monotone present bias. Therefore Lemma 1 applies, and the eﬀective subjective
discount rate will move together with the intertemporal substitution eﬀect if γ > 1.
We therefore obtain the same co-movements among the three determinants of the
risk-free rate as in the case of quasi-hyperbolic preferences.
Note that −Dδ(t)/δ(t) is increasing in ρ and ξ, and decreasing in ζ (since a higher
value of ζ speeds up the transition from ρ+ξ to ρ.) To make consumers more present-
biased while keeping the level of the risk-free rate the same, one can simultaneously
increase ξ and ζ,a n dl o w e rρ. Lemma 2 implies that the increase in ξ tends to make
the wealth-consumption ratio less volatile, while the increase in ζ and the decrease
in ρ will make it more volatile. This suggest an ambiguous eﬀect of present bias.
21But if we take ζ to be large and ξ on the same order as ζ/ln(ζ), then the hyperbolic
discount function is well approximated by a quasi-hyperbolic discount function, and
o u rr e s u l t sf o rt h el a t t e rs h o u l da p p l y . N u m e r i c a le x p e r i m e n t sc o n ￿rm that this is
indeed the case.
Implications Our examples suggest that if endowments are such that expected
utility ratios exhibit monotone dynamics, and if subjective discount functions exhibit
monotone present bias, then the eﬀective subjective discount rate tends to move
together with the intertemporal substitution term that determines the risk-free rate.
This can make the risk-free rate more or less volatile, depending on the magnitude of
the precautionary savings eﬀect. At the same time, these examples indicate that the
wealth-consumption ratio becomes unambiguously more volatile as a result of present
bias.
In US data, aggregate consumption growth does not seem to exhibit much pre-
dictability, and this implies that the eﬀective impatience is going to be close to con-
stant. Nevertheless, there are two ways in which our results can potentially shed light
on asset pricing puzzles. First, participation in ￿nancial markets may be limited, and
the consumption processes of those who do participate may exhibit signi￿cant pre-
dictability. Second, our results continue to apply when the period utility function
is replaced by [(ct − ct)1−γ − 1]/(1 − γ),w h e r ect is a subsistence or habit level of
consumption. For example, the habit persistence model of Campbell and Cochrane
(1999) generates a net-of-habit consumption process ct −ct that has stochastic prop-
erties that are very similar to those of −xt,w h e r ext is given by (38). An interesting
question for further research is whether present bias moves the implications of these
models closer to the data.
6. Concluding Remarks
In an in￿nite-horizon exchange economy in which consumers cannot commit to future
choices and in which period utilities are expected to grow at a constant rate, price
and consumption data can be interpreted as resulting from the optimal choices of
consumers whose subjective rates of time preference are constant. A similar obser-
vational equivalence applies for essentially arbitrary endowment processes if period
utility functions happen to be logarithmic.
Inferences about the shape of subjective discount functions can be made when
consumers can make irreversible commitments regarding future consumption levels,
as in Laibson (1997), or when consumers face binding borrowing constraints, as in
the buﬀer-stock savings model analyzed by Harris and Laibson (1999). In this paper,
we abstract from market frictions or other commitment devices. Instead, we exam-
ine the observable implications of alternative assumptions about subjective discount
22functions when there is serial dependence in utility.
An important feature of the continuous-time approximation we present is the fact
that the instantaneous market price of risk does not depend on the subjective discount
function of consumers. In other words, short-horizon Sharpe ratios are not aﬀected by
how consumers discount utility. Subjective rates of time preference do in￿uence the
dynamics of the instantaneous risk-free rate. In turn, this aﬀects how the dividends
of long-lived assets are discounted, and this has implications for the volatility and risk
premia on such assets. For example, present bias can, under certain conditions, make
aggregate wealth more volatile, even when it reduces the volatility of the risk-free
rate.
For the period utility functions we consider, serial dependence in utility is the
result of serial dependence in endowment growth. Serial dependence in utility can
also be generated by habit persistence and by the consumption of durable goods. If
preferences are homothetic, linear equilibria of the type derived in this paper can again
be constructed. How these aspects of consumer preferences interact with hyperbolic
subjective rates of time preference is an interesting subject for further research. Linear
equilibria can also be constructed for economies in which utility is no longer time and
state separable, as long as preferences remain homothetic. In Luttmer and Mariotti
(2000b) we extend the work of Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) on non-expected utility
to a very general class of non-recursive homothetic preferences.
AE q u i l i b r i u m
To prove Proposition 1, we proceed in two steps. We ￿rst give a precise statement
and proof of the ￿rst-order condition (11). Next, we check that Conditions A and
B imply the existence of an equilibrium in which there is no long-lived asset that is
available in positive net supply.
Proof of the First-Order Condition (11). Given current wealth wt > 0,t h e

















t+1 is the set of nonnegative Ft+1￿measurable random variables, At+1 ∈ L
+
t+1
is an almost surely positive random variable that is equal to ∆t+1/Γ
1−γ
t+1 in equilibrium,
and πt+1/πt ∈ L
+
t+1 represents the relative price of next-period consumption.
Lemma 3 Suppose that (39) has a solution (c∗
t,w ∗
t+1) at which expected discounted
utility is ￿nite. Then (11) holds almost surely, i.e., πt+1/πt = At+1Du(w∗
t+1)/Du(c∗
t).
Proof. Since At+1 is almost surely positive and the marginal utility Du is in￿nite
at zero, c∗
t and w∗
t+1 must be both positive at the maximum. Furthermore, given
23that u is strictly increasing, the budget constraint must be binding at the maximum.
Perturb w∗
t+1 to wt+1 =( 1+ε)w∗
t+1 for some ε close enough to 0 and take ct = wt −
Et[(πt+1/πt)wt+1]. Clearly, the mapping ε 7→ Et[At+1u((1 + ε)w∗
t+1)] is diﬀerentiable
on R++. The optimality of (c∗
t,w ∗







































Alternatively, consider perturbing wealth to wt+1 =( 1+ειB)w∗
t+1 for some ε ≥ 0 and
B ∈ Ft+1.F o rε close enough to 0, wt − Et[(πt+1/πt)wt+1] is positive. Furthermore,
























t+1) and expected utility is ￿nite, the right-hand
side of this inequality is integrable. The diﬀerentiability of u on R++ together with
the dominated convergence theorem therefore implies that the right-derivative of
the mapping ε 7→ Et[At+1u((1 + ειB)w∗
t+1)] at ε =0is well-de￿ned and given by
Et[At+1ιBw∗
t+1Du(w∗
t+1)]. The optimality of (c∗
t,w ∗

























t+1 =0almost surely. Since w∗
t+1 is always
positive, the result follows.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .By assumption, Γt, ∆t and At+1 = ∆t+1 /Γ
1−γ
t+1 are well-
de￿ned and almost surely ￿nite for any t ≥ 0. By construction, the consumption and
wealth choices (φtwt,ψt+1wt) satisfy the ￿rst-order condition (11) at market-clearing
prices πt+1/πt =( ∆t+1/Γt+1)(et+1/et)−γ,w h e r eφt and ψt+1 are given by (17). It
then follows from the concavity of the objective function in (39) that (φtwt,ψt+1wt)
is optimal from the perspective of the date-t consumer. In the text, we have only
imposed that consumption choices grow at the same rate as aggregate endowments.
Goods market clearing at all dates is therefore equivalent to the condition w0 = e0Γ0.
















Iterating on this identity, using (18) to eliminate ∆t+1, one can verify that requiring
(42) at date 0 is in fact equivalent to the goods market clearing condition w0 = e0Γ0.





+πtzt,w h e r e{zt}∞
t=0 is a non-negative sequence of random variables
that satis￿es:
πtzt =E t [πt+1zt+1] (43)
for all t ≥ 0. This says that the value of the stock must be equal to the present
value of dividends, plus a non-negative ￿bubble.￿ The stock market and markets for
contingent claims clear when kt = k−1 and bt+1 =0for all t. This implies that, in
equilibrium, πtwt =Et [
P∞
s=t πses]+πtztkt−1. It therefore follows from (7) and (42)





If k−1 > 0, then (44) uniquely determines the bubble process {zt}∞
t=0. Note that the
right-hand side of (44) is by construction a non-negative martingale, and thus (43)
holds. If instead k−1 =0 , then any non-negative {zt}∞
t=0 that satis￿es (43) will be
consistent with equilibrium provided the right-hand side of (44) is zero. Using (18),
one can see that the right-hand side of (44) is zero if and only if (19) holds. Thus,
to conclude the proof, we need only to check that Conditions A and B imply (19).























































≤ (1 − κ)
T,
from which (19) follows. Under Condition B we can write ∆t/Γt ≤ β for any t ≥ 0
since ∆t/Γt is an average of δn+1/δn ≤ β .A l s o ,δn ≤ β








































Condition B implies that the right-hand side of this inequality converges to zero as
T goes to in￿nity. Hence the result.
25B Continuous-Time Approximation
In the following, {xt}t≥0 denotes a continuous-time Markov process de￿n e do nt h e
same probability space (Ω,F,P) as the endowment process {et}t≥0, and taking its
values in some state space X ⊂ RN.E n d o w m e n t s{et}t≥0 are positive and, for any
x ∈ X and t ≥ 0, G(x,t) is de￿ned as in the text. The following assumptions will be
maintained in the remainder of this Appendix.
Assumption 1 The subjective discount function δ : R+ → [0,1] is non-increasing,
left-continuous and positive on a set of positive Lebesgue measure. Moreover, δ is
integrable over R+ and δ(0) = 1.
Assumption 2 There exists a function M : X → R+ that is bounded on compact
subsets of X a n ds u c ht h a tG(x,t) ≤ M(x) for all x ∈ X and t ≥ 0.
Assumption 3 The function G(x,•) is continuous for every x ∈ X.M o r e o v e r ,t h e
family of functions {G(•,t)}t∈R+ is equicontinuous at any x ∈ X.
Since δ is non-increasing and integrable over R+, limt→∞ δ(t)=0 .T h u sδ induces a
unique probability measure ￿δ on the Borel sets of R+ such that ￿δ([s,t)) = δ(s)−δ(t)
for any t>s≥ 0 (Lang (1993, Proposition X.1.8)). By Fubini￿s theorem, we may
rewrite (29) and (30) as Φ(x)=
R
[0,∞) G(x,t)d￿δ(t) and Γ(x)=
R ∞
0 δ(t)G(x,t)dt,
respectively, for any x ∈ X. Assumptions 1-3 ensure that these functions are well
de￿ned and ￿nite. Furthermore, Γ(x) is positive for all x in X since G(x,•) > 0 and
δ > 0 on some set of positive Lebesgue measure. Assumption 3 ensures that Γ is
continuous on X.I t f o l l o w s t h a t Γ is bounded away from zero on compact subsets
of X.A l s o , Φ is positive and bounded above by M.F o r a n y τ > 0 and x ∈ X,
de￿ne Γ(x,τ)=
P∞
n=0 δ(nτ)G(x,nτ) and ∆(x,τ)=
P∞
n=0 δ((n +1 ) τ)G(x,nτ), and
let Φ(x,τ)=Γ(x,τ) − ∆(x,τ). Assumptions 1 and 2 ensures that these sums are
￿nite for any τ > 0 and x ∈ X,a n dt h a tΓ(x,τ) is positive for all τ > 0 small
enough. It follows from the monotone convergence theorem that Γ(xt,τ)=Γt(τ) and
∆(xt,τ)=∆t(τ) for any t ≥ 0 and τ > 0.
Lemma 4 For any x ∈ X, limτ→0+ τ Γ(x,τ)=Γ(x).
Proof. For any τ > 0, t ≥ 0,a n dx ∈ X,l e tGτ(x,t)=G(x,τ[[t/τ]]) and δτ(t)=








Assumptions 1-2 imply that δτ(t)Gτ(x,t) ≤ M(x) for any t ∈ [0,1) and τ > 0,a s
well as δτ(t)Gτ(x,t) ≤ δ(t − 1)M(x) for all t ≥ 1 and τ ∈ (0,1].T h u sδτ Gτ(x,•) is
26dominated for all τ ∈ (0,1] by an integrable function of t.M o r e o v e r ,t h ec o n t i n u i t yo f
G(x,•) implies that limτ→0+ Gτ(x,t)=G(x,t) and the left-continuity of δ implies that
limτ→0+ δτ(t)=δ(t). The result then follows by Lebesgue￿s dominated convergence
theorem.
Lemma 5 As τ goes to 0+, τ Γ(•,τ) converges uniformly to Γ on every compact
subset of X.
Proof. Assumption 3 implies that the family {G(•,t)}t∈R+ is uniformly equicontin-
uous on any compact subset K of X.H e n c e ,f o ra n yε > 0,t h e r ee x i s t sη > 0 such
that for all t ≥ 0 and τ ∈ (0,1], |Gτ(x,t) − Gτ(y,t)| ≤ ε/(1 +
R ∞
0 δ(v)dv) for any
x,y ∈ K such that kx − yk < η. It follows that for any τ ∈ (0,1],
|τ Γ(x,t) − τ Γ(y,t)| ≤
Z ∞
0
δτ(v)|Gτ(x,v) − Gτ(y,v)|dv ≤ ε





n=0 δ(nτ)τ ≤ τ +
R ∞
0 δ(v)dv as δ is decreasing over
R+. This implies that the family {τΓ(•,τ)}τ∈(0,1] is uniformly equicontinuous on
K. By Ascoli￿s theorem (Lang (1993, Theorem III.3.1 and Corollary III.3.3)), the
convergence of τ Γ(•,τ) to Γ as τ goes to 0+ is therefore uniform on K.
Lemma 6 For any x ∈ X, limτ→0+ Φ(x,τ)=Φ(x).








As before, limτ→0+ Gτ(x,t)=G(x,t) and Gτ(x,t) ≤ M(x) for any τ > 0, t ≥ 0
and x ∈ X.S i n c e ￿δ is a probability measure, the result follows immediately from
Lebesgue￿s dominated convergence theorem.
We can now state and prove our main result.
Proposition 3 If the Markov processes {xt}t≥0 and {et}t≥0 have almost surely con-
tinuous sample paths, and if Assumptions 1-3 are satis￿ed, then for almost every
ω ∈ Ω, limτ→0+ πω









t for each t ≥ 0.
Proof. Consider a continuous sample path {xω
t }t≥0.A t a n y d a t e t = kτ, k ∈ N,
discrete-time state prices are given by:
π
ω






































for all τ > 0 and x ∈ X.A td a t e st 6= kτ, k ∈ N,s i m p l ys e tπω
t (τ)=πω
τ[[t/τ]](τ).B y
Lemmas 4 and 6, limτ→0+ Q(x,τ)=−Φ(x)/Γ(x) for any x ∈ X. Next, recall that
limτ→0+ τ Γ(x,τ)=Γ(x) uniformly on compact subsets K of X. Hence, since xω
v is a
continuous function of v, limτ→0+ τ Γ(xω
τ[[v/τ]],τ)=Γ(xω
v) uniformly on [0,t]. Therefore
τ Γ(xω
τ[[v/τ]],τ) is bounded away from zero on [0,t] for all τ > 0 small enough. Because
￿δ is a probability measure and G(x,•) ∈ [0,M(x)],w ek n o wt h a tΦ(x,τ) ∈ [0,M(x)]
for any x ∈ X and τ > 0 small enough. Thus Q(xω
τ[[v/τ]],τ) is uniformly bounded on
[0,t],f o ra l lτ > 0 small enough. The result then follows from Lebesgue￿s dominated
convergence theorem and the continuity of {xω
t ,e ω
t }t≥0 for almost every ω ∈ Ω.
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